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Accountability and Organizational Survival: 
A Study of the Spanish Newspaper Industry (1966-1993) 
Differentiallife chances have been thoroughly investigated in organization 
theory (see Baum and Oliver, 1996). First, organizational mortality constitutes a 
prominent stream of research in population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989). 
Empirical work in this area of research has provided statistical evidence of the effects on 
the failure rates of firms of variables such as organizational age (e.g., Freeman, Carroll, 
and Hannan, 1983; Brüderl and Schüssler, 1990), population density (e.g., Carroll and 
Hannan, 1989; Hannan and Carroll, 1992), and changes in organizational core 
characteristics (e.g., Carroll, 1984; Haveman, 1992). This stream of research, however, 
has not delved into the survival chances of organizations that render accounts oftheir 
activities relative to those firms that do no1. Second, institutional theory has emphasized 
the survival implications of those firms that conform to their institutional environment 
and its concomitant rules and norms (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). Nevertheless, a review of empirical studies in this area reveals that little is known 
about how organizations conform to pressures for accountability, and ifthis in turn may 
affect their life prospects. The absence of empirical evidence from both the population 
ecology and the institutional theory perspectives is especially significant because 
accountability is depicted as a salient feature of modern organizations (HalU1an and 
Freeman, 1984). Modern organizations, Hannan and Freeman (1984: 153) argue, 
experience strong demands to account rationally for their actions as an outcome of both 
"the spread of general norms of rationality in the modern world (Weber, 1968) and [of] 
a variety of external and internal contingencies." 
Accountability, according to Gibbins and Newton (1994: 166), comprises a 
relationship, driven by social, contractual, 01' other factors between the source (e.g., 
corporate constituents) and the accountable organization (e.g., the organization that 
renders accounts to its constituents) in which the latter has incentives to behave as the 
former wishes. The accountability notion spilled over its original field of politics into 
the economic arena as a consequence of the increasingly complex and varied 
relationship between an organization and the parties to whom it must respond; the 
separation of ownership from corporate control illustrates the rationale for the 
increasing importance of accountability practices in organizations. The relation of 
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accountability is exemplified by the organizational process of rendering accounts of its 
activities to external constituents (e.g., accountable organizations' reporting to sources 
on their environmental protection activities). 
The practical significance of accountability has been examined by several studies 
that have analyzed the underlying reasons why organizations report on their activities, 
ranging from the stakeholder (Meznar, Nigh, and Kwok, 1994) to the critical accounting 
(Roberts and Scapens, 1985) theories. The emphasis of these studies on the 
accountability relationship, however, has been at the expense oftheir explicit empirical 
focus on the effects of not satisfying external demands for information on firms' 
chances for survival. In this papel' \Ve suggest that accountability will significantly affect 
an organization's life chances. Empirical evidence to test this central proposition has 
been gathered for the entire newspaper industry in Spain, covering aH the daily 
newspapers published in this coul1try during the period 1966-1993. This period 
witnessed radical political, economic, and social changes that brought about the 
peaceful replacement of a military dictatorship by a fuH-fledged democracy. This setting 
constitutes a unique sociallaboratory to investigate organizational reactions to 
environmental pressures (Guillén, 1994). 
Studies investigating the effects oflegitimation on a population's chances for 
survival (e.g., Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986; Rao, 1994) bear some resemblance to 
this paper. Singh et al. (1986) examined the impact ofregistration by a state agency and 
listings in a public directory on the life chances ofvoluntary social service organizations 
ofToronto. The results showed that organizations receiving this public endorsement 
enhanced their survival prospects during their early years of operation. Rao (1994) 
studied the American auto industry during the years 1895 to 1912 to test how 
certification contests legitimate organizations, generate status orderings, and create 
favorable reputations. The results supported the idea that cumulative victories in 
contests extend the life chances ofwinning organizations. Our papel', in contrast, places 
less emphasis on the legitimizing effect of external certifications on firms' survival 
prospects. Instead, it focuses on the organizational practice of rendering regular 
accounts of its activities to external constituencies, and if this in turn may enhance the 
organization's life chances. 
Investigation ofthe relationship between accountability and organizational 
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chances of survival may be of interest within the realm of organization theory. First, 
population ecologists embrace accountability as a prominent assumption ofthe model of 
structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Despite the importance ofthe notion of 
accountability for this stream of research, however, the effects of accountability 
practices on survival prospects of organizations have not been empirically examined. 
Second, institutional theory suggests that organizations are influenced by wider societal 
and cultural expectations (Dacin, 1997; Oliver, 1997), whose accomplishment would in 
turn extend life prospects offirms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). 
Accountability is particularly depicted as a salient societal expectation; Hannan and 
Freeman (1984) highlight it as a constituent feature ofmodem society. Neve11heless, in 
spite of the distinctive significance of accountability as a societal demand, investigation 
of its effects on organizational survival has been neglected by institutional theorists. 
Our papel' contends that the notions of accountability and organizational survival 
are causally linked without claiming that such a relationship is unidimensional in nature. 
Different organizational studies contend that environnlental selection is not driven 
solely by the effects oflow performance (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Scott, 1987; 
Gimeno et al., f011hcoming). In line with these arguments, we assert that accountability 
is one of the factors that influence life chances of organizations. Therefore, firms that 
render accounts of their activities enhance their likelihood of survival versus those that 
do not. everything else remaining equal. 
Our investigation attempts to fill several research gaps conceming organizational 
accountability as a predictor of firm survival. First, little is known about the extent to 
which accountable organizations show different long-term survival prospects compared 
\vith those of nonaccountable organizations. Second, we still have much to leam about 
the different intensities of institutional and interest groups' pressures for accountability 
and to \",hat extent these varying pressures elicit agreement and compliance from 
organizations. Third, there is no available evidence on whether the imposition of legal 
accountability requirements may diminish the extent to which organizations report on 
their activities (Le., the leve! ofaccountability), and ifthis in turn could have sorne 
impact on the probability of survival. 
3 
----
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
 
Accountability and Survival Chances
 
Increased rationalization is a notable force of modern society (Weber, 1968; 
Meyer, 1994). Even though the concept of rationalization and its practical implications 
are contentious issues in organization theory, there exists sorne consensus in defining 
the concept as the deployment of instrumental behavior to reach desired ends (Scott, 
1995: 138). Rationalized practices and procedures pervade the terrain of organizations, 
spreading out a diversity of activities and beliefs buttressed by "institutionalized myths" 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Institutional theorists (see Scott, 1992: 117) contend that 
external constituents such as interest groups, nation-states, and professional associations 
enforce institutionalized myths. Organizations complying with institutionalized myths 
and their accompanying rules and norms receive sociallegitimacy and avoid claims of 
"negligent or irrational behavior" (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
The aforementioned relationship of accountability between the source and the 
accountable organization illustrates the process of external pressures for organizations to 
behave rationally. Due to the increasing distance among aH actors involved in the 
relationship of accountability (e.g., between managers and firms' stockholders), the 
accountable organization is required by its external constituencies to expose its 
ste'Yardship of resources for aH to see. Interestingly, Hannan and Freeman note that 
accountability 
does not necessarily mean that organizations must tell the truth both to their members and to the public 
about how resources ",ere used and ho", some debacle came about. What matters is that organizations 
can make internally consistent arguments to the effect that appropriate rules and procedures existed to 
produce rational allocation of resources and appropriate organizational actions. (1984: 153) 
Organizations providing repetitive accounts oftheir activities, hence, are 
regarded as stable and reliable and invested with legitimacy. Accountable organizations, 
then, enjoy the concomitant effects of legitimacy, which in turn increase their access to 
resources and extend their life chances (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). Selection within organizational populations would tend to 
eliminate nonaccountable organizations (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Thus, we 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: Accountable organizations should show higher survival chances 
than comparable nonaccountable organizations. 
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Pressures for Accountability and Probabilit)' of Sun'ival 
If Hypothesis 1 is supported, we could conceive of an overt relationship between 
accountability and survival prospects; the failure of organizations that do not render 
accounts of their activities would be the ultimate outcome of a process of environrnental 
selection. Accountability demands, however, as many other normative prescriptions 
arising from the broader sociocultural environrnent (see Dacin, 1997), can vary over 
time and across organizations. First, institutional theorists contend that sorne norms 
affect organizations with a constant degree of intensity, whereas others increase or 
decrease their influence on firms over time (see Mezias and Scarselletta, 1994: 654; 
Scott and Meyer, 1994). Institutions, thus, are not monolithic and do not always elicit 
compliance and agreement from organizations. Conformity with institutional norms 
constitutes one organizational choice among the several strategic alternatives to tackle 
the finn environment relationship (Oliver, 1991). In line with these arguments, we 
propose that the organizational response to external pressures for accountability, and its 
collateral effects on life chances, will depend on the expected social worthiness and 
access to resources attached to such response. 
Organizational response to external demands depends on the resources supplied 
to the firm by constituents (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), 
and this in turn will be subject to the degree of such pressures. Resources not only 
comprise tangible assets or market share but also political power and social legitimacy 
(Carroll and Delacroix, 1982; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Organizations garner social 
",011hiness by aligning their goals and practices with prevailing values and beliefs in the 
institutional environment (Baum and Oliver, 1996: 1389). Organizations that obtain 
social support increase their survival chances by avoiding questions about their actions 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1983) and heightening their legitimacy 
(Oliver, 1991). As Carruthers (1995: 317) puts it, "Being technically efficient is not the 
only path to organizational survival. Achieving legitimacy in the eyes ofthe world, 
state, powerful professions, or society at large is another effective survival strategy." 
Second, demands for accountability also vary across organizations. Hannan and 
Freeman (1984: 153) predict that such pressures are "especially intense during 
organization building due to the requirements of initial resource mobilization." In 
particular. accountability pressures, in Hannan and Freeman's opinion, will be more 
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intense when (1) organizations produce symbolic or information-Ioaded product; (2) 
substantial risks exist (e.g., providing medical care); (3) long-term relationships between 
the organization and its employees or clients are typical; and (4) the organization's 
purposes are highly political. Although Hannan and Freeman assert that their argument 
will presumably apply more strongly to organizations in these categories, they also state 
that all organizations seem to be subject to at least moderate levels of accountability 
pressures. 
Institutional arguments, however, cannot provide a thorough explanation of a 
firms' behavior and structure. On the contrary, institutional pressures intertwine with 
other forces (e.g., market) rather than replacing them. Unlike institutional theory, which 
links external pressures to shared values and institutionalized myths, resource 
dependence theory underlines that demand compliance will be a function of the 
organizational expectations of mobilizing resources. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 45-50) 
assert that the dependence of one organization on another constituent will be affected by 
three factors: (i) the importance ofthe resource provided by that external party, (ii) the 
extent to which the external constituent has discretion ayer the resource allocation and 
use, and (iii) the extent to which there are few alternatives. It follows that organizational 
constituents supplying the firm with important resources become its distinctive 
stakeholders and, in turn, expect their demands to be met. 
Stakeholder theory analyzes pressures from different stakeholders. It argues that 
a stakeholder's power to influence organizational behavior is a function ofthe 
stakeholder's degree of control over resources required by the organization (Ullmann, 
1985). Freeman (1983) defines a stakeholder as any group 01' individual who can affect 
01' is affected by the achievement ofthe firm's objectives. According to Hill and Jones 
(1992: 140-143), the accomplislm1ent of the stakeholder function requires the existence 
of (a) monitoring devices that have the effect of reducing information asymmetry (e.g., 
public reporting demands) and (b) enforcement mechanisms (including the law) and 
"exit" (the possibility, 01' credible threat of withdrawal from the stakeholder 
relationship). 
We suggested in Hypothesis 1 that organizational compliance with pressures for 
accountability from external constituents entails long-term selective consequences. In 
concrete, shorter periods, however, organizational responses to accountability demands 
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will depend on the expected social worthiness attached to such practices and/or on the 
degree of organizational dependence on resources controlled by the external 
constituent(s) that makes those claims. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: The organization's level of accountability will be higher if 
there are social rewards attached to such practices and/or if there are 
pressures for information from powerful organizational constituents, and 
this in turn will enhance the firnl' s probability of survival. 
Voluntary Accountability, Accounting Regulation, and Survival Chances 
At a conceptuallevel, we find inconsistent theoretical predictions ofthe eventual 
impact of accounting regulation on accountability, which in turn could affect the 
probability of organizational failure. Both the institutional theory and the resource­
dependence perspectives admit that organizations tackle conflicting environmental 
pressures. Institutional theorists argue that rules may conflict with one another because 
ceremonial rules are transmitted by myths that may arise from different parts of the 
environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The resource-dependence model places more 
emphasis on the impact that meeting adversarial demands has on access to resources; 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 27, 43) contend that demands ofien conflict and that 
response to the demands of one group constrains the organization in its future actions. 
Stakeholder theory provides some perceptive suggestions to operationalize the 
organizational functioning of competing environmental demands. This theory 
establishes that stakeholders such as customers, owners, suppliers, and public groups are 
not adversarial in nature (Freeman, 1983) but may have adversarial positions. Sturdivant 
(1979) tested conflicts of interest concerning the social responsibility attitudes of 
stakeholders such as corporate managers and activist group leaders. As expected, the 
study showed stronger social attitudes in activist group leaders. Meznar et al. (1994) 
found that corporate announcements of withdrawal from South Africa were 
accompanied by a significant drop in the value of the withdrawing firms' stock. Results 
of that study, thus, supported a basic premise of stakeholder theory: Stockholders' 
interests do not always have preeminent status in firms' management. As far as the 
management of the disclosure process is concerned, Carnaghan, Gibbins, and Ikaheimo 
(1996: 176) state that "the larger the set (of stakeholders), the more room for conflict 
among stakeholders, diffuse disclosure roles and responsibilities, and frequent attention 
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to disclosure. All ofthese are likely to lead to ambiguous accountability relationships 
and an unclear role for the firm's disclosures in meeting stakeholders' information 
needs." Accounting regulation, it follows, may increase the importance of a stakeholder 
group, provoking changes in the overall process of accountability. Although 
management should respond to these changes through the adoption of new routines, the 
implementation of these routines may be hindered by strong forces such as the resources 
already expended to set up current practices and existing accountability relationships. If 
corporate managers face a conflict between the demands for accountability of two 
different categories of stakeholders, with only one ofthese demands endorsed by new 
accounting regulation, it may be expected that managers will stress compliance with the 
compulsory accountability requirement at the expense ofthe existing voluntary 
disclosure. Consequently, this change in priorities may bring about a reduction or 
elimination in the level of voluntary accountability previously relegated to a different 
category of stakeholders. 
An alternative prediction to the predictions ofthese studies draws on the 
contributions of population ecologists (Hannan and Freeman, 1984: 153), who argue 
that demands for accountability are not only "widespread and intense in the modern 
world" but are aIso "strong and getting stronger:' This perspective, thus, predicts that 
organizations would rather satisfy competing demands for information from different 
stakeholders than diminish the existing levels of voluntary accountability as a 
consequence of new compulsory accountability requirements. According to this 
perspective, we conclude that the enactment ofnew accounting regulation would merely 
represent a step forward in the ongoing social process that relegates demands for more 
intense accountability from organizations to external parties. 
Given these inconsistent theoretical predictions between the stakeholder and the 
population ecology perspectives, we reexamine the effects of new accounting regulation 
on existing voluntary disclosures and the related probability of organizational survival. 
This leads us to explore the following alternative possibilities: 
Hypothesis 3a: New compulsory accounting regulation wiII affect the existing 
practices of accountability (stakeholder prediction), or 
Hypothesis 3b (ALT): New compulsory accounting regulation wil1 not affect the 
existing practices of accountability (population ecology prediction). 
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Research Setting 
The entire newspaper industry of Spain was used as the population of 
organizations, comprising all newspapers published in this country during the period 
1966-1993. Newspapers are defined as periodicals published at least four times a week. 
Both generalist and specialist (e.g., sports, medicine) dailies covering either national or 
local markets fall within the domain of this study. 
Newspapers were chosen for bearing potential exposure to the pressures of 
accountability for a number of reasons. First, Scott (1995: 19) contends that 
organizations with diffuse goals are more subject to processes of institutionalization. In 
this respect, newspapers are perceived as entities that may combine financial and 
political goals (Carroll, 1995). Second, as we noted aboye, population ecologists 
predicted that industries producing information-loaded products, as well as those with a 
highly political component, could experience strong accountability pressures (Halman 
and Freeman, 1984: 153). The newspaper industry, we argue, has a strong political 
component and produces information-loaded products. 
The population under study consists of276 newspapers. Population density 
peaked dllring the period 1978-1989, leading to an increase in the number of 
newspapers from 147 newspapers in the 1966-1977 period to 232 dailies. The density of 
poplllation then slumped in the 1990-1993 period, resulting in a decrease in daily 
operation to 167 newspapers. A trait of the population is the low-medium level of its 
circlllation in comparative terms. This central attribute, along with the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of newspapers'goals, makes this population particularly vulnerable to 
changes in a turbulent economic, social, and political environment that, as we will see 
below, characterized the Spanish society during the period 1966-1993. As Carroll 
(1995: 184) contends, "Both economic and political processes have played roles in 
shaping the organizational populations of newspapers." 
Sources oC data 
The database was created from three separate primary sources. The sources were 
set up as a consequence of the promulgation of the Law of Press and Printing of 1966, 
when Spain was ruled under the dictatorship of General Franco. The law reduced the 
extent of censorship and instilled in the industry sorne elements of liberalization. Within 
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this context, certain sources of data were set up as venues for providing external parties 
with reliable information on newspaper organizations. The first source of data is the 
Registry ofthe Spanish Public Administration (Registro General de la Administración 
Pública), which contains a census of aH the daily newspapers published in Spain since 
1966. Firms were obliged to deliver the foHowing general information to the Registry: 
newspaper's name, list of founders, ownership structure, number of pages and price of 
one paper's issue at the moment of registering, newspaper contents (e.g., general, 
sports), and address. The second source is the Media Guide ofSpain (Guía General de 
Medios de Comunicación Socia!), a quarterly publication that reports detailed 
demographic data on each firm, including when it \Vas founded; when it ceased 
operations (if applicable); the printing technology it uses; the names ofthe director of 
the newspaper, CEO ofthe company, and advertising manager; the exact date of 
succession of these senior executives (if applicable); the features of the design of 
newspaper issues and advertisement rates; and membership in the State political pa11y 
(until 1977, if applicable). The ¡Hedia Guide provides a directory of all existing 
newspapers. Certain specific items ofthe comprehensive demographic list contained in 
the Guide are voluntarily supplied by ne\Vspaper organizations. The third source of data 
is an ongoing report produced by an independent association of newspapers (Oficina 
para la Justificación de la Difusión, OJO hereafter), \Vhich audits the circulation of 
newspapers and publishes monthly rep0l1s. The foundation ofthe 010 mimicked 
foreign associations, such as those operating in the United States (Audit Bureau of 
Circulations, since 1914) and France (Office de Justification des Tirages, since 1923), to 
provide the adve11ising industry \Vith reliable information on the circulation of dailies. 
Newspapers are voluntarily audited and, thus, give the OJO auditors access to 
information concerning their production, distribution, and accounting processes. 
We have also collected data on the evolution ofthe advertising sector during the 
period 1975-1993 (e.g., the number of advertisements published in newspapers). These 
data could not be used in the testing of hypotheses as they were not available for the 
complete period of study. Nevertheless, \Ve used them in the Oiscussion section ofthis 
article as they were instrumental in illuminating the evolution ofthe Spanish advertising 
sector, a critical stakeholder for the newspaper industry. 
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Period of study 
The period from 1966 to 1993 witnessed the dramatic social, political, and 
economic changes that brought about the peaceful replacement in Spain of a military 
dictatorship with a full-fledged democracy. The starting year ofthe study, 1966, 
coincides both with the enactment of the Law of Press and Printing and with the setup 
of the three sources of data that enable one to track developments in the newspaper 
industry. The final year of analysis, 1993, corresponds with the deployment of the single 
European market. To account for the changes undergone by the newspaper industry, the 
period of study has been divided into the following subperiods: 
(a) The Franco era (1966-1977). Spain had been ruled since 1936 by a military 
dictatorship headed by General Francisco Franco. The dictatorship, whose origins 
were characterized by harsh repression and economic autarchy, unde1100k some 
timid reforms in the late 1950s and early 1960s to instill the regime with some 
liberal elements (Guillén, 1994). By implementing the reforms, the dictatorship 
sought international political recognition and foreign investment. Within this 
context. the Law of Press and Printing of 1966 played an instrumental role as it 
diluted the existing censorship and created organizations (e.g., the Media Cuide of 
Spain and the üJD) that rationalized the adve11ising sector. These reforms, though, 
were outweighed by the regime's deficits in the areas of human rights (e.g., freedom 
of speech, right of political dissent) and civil rights (e.g., subordination of women to 
men). The newspaper industry reflected this complex situation; during this 
subperiod, 42 dailies out of the existing 147 newspapers were owned by the single 
political party, ofFascist ideology. Moreover, the entire industry was a regular 
recipient of across-the-board, massive subsidies from the State (e.g., newsprint) to 
foster political consent with the dictatorship. General Franco died in November 
1975. The first free general elections to a democratic Parliament were held in the 
country in June 1977, right after the suppression ofthe single-party rule. 
(b) Pre-Corporate Disclosure Regulation (1978-1989). The fundamentals of a full­
fledged democracy were enshrined in the liberal Constitution of 1978, whose 
development required extensive legislative reforms during the 1980s. Spain gained 
widespread international recognition for its peaceful transition from dictatorship to 
democracy. The recognition rendered tangible results: The international community 
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endorsed the entry of Spain into exclusive organizations such as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), in 1982, and the European Economic Community 
(EEC), in 1986. Spain's entry into the EEC involved a hectic period of legislative 
reforms to harmonize the Spanish political and economic systems with the 
requirements of the EEC. In the area of company regulation, Spain issued laws and 
decrees to reform its stock market (1988), auditing sector (1989), and, as we wiII see 
below, company's disclosure policy (1990). The newspaper industry was affected by 
the liberal reforms put in place since the promulgation ofthe Constitution of 1978. 
First, newspapers formerly affiliated with the single party were either privatized or 
closed down, and second, the State dispensed with its policy of providing across­
the-board subsidies to the industry. 
(c) Post-Corporate Oisclosure Regulation (1990-1993). The 1990s witnessed an 
increasingly active role by Spain in the international arena, especiaIIy reflected in 
the Spain's hosting ofevents such as the Middle-East Peace Summit (1991) and the 
1992 Olympic Games. Reforms of corporate regulation concluded with the 
promulgation of the Oecree on Corporate Disclosure (OCO) of 1990, aIIuded to 
aboye, which hannonized domestic regulation with European standards. In 
particular, the OCO particularly forced Spanish firms to prepare their financial 
statements according to a strict interpretation ofthe 4th EEC Oirective on corporate 
law. Since 1990, Spanish public corporations are obliged to deliver their financial 
statements to a mercantile register (Regis/ro Mercan/il). Until 1990, the rule 
requiring public notice of companies' financial statements only applied to finns 
operating in regulated industries and/or listed on the stock market. 
Operationalization of the variables 
Organizational duration. The duration of each newspaper was calculated as the 
difference between its founding and failure dates. Failure was defined as bankruptcy or 
a permanent cessation of operations. Ouration was measured through an indicator that 
divided the number of days a newspaper was in operation by 365. Ifthe firm continued 
to exist as of 1993, it was treated as right-censored data (see Lawless, 1982: 31, for a 
discussion of this topic). This duration index is considered dependent, that is, as the 
variable to be explained in the models. 
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Accountability. In spite of our understanding of the notion of accountability as a single 
phenomenon, we created two variables (the Media Guide Accoun/ability and 
Circula/ion Audi/s) to measure its effects on the likelihood of survival. The two 
variables serve to capture different dimensions of the notion of accountability, as shown 
by their low Cronbach alpha coefficient (0.4847) (see Cronbach, 1951). The variables 
were created for the complete period of study as well as for each subperiod. The first 
construct draws on the data collected from the Media Guide ofSpain (Media Guide 
Accoun/ability), which contains information about five internal attributes of newspapers. 
To elaborate a measure ofthis variable, the following procedure was used: 
Organizations received a score on the Media Guide Accoll11/ability variable equivalent 
to the division of reported items by five, which is the maximum number of items to be 
reported through this source of data. The second construct is supported by information 
published in the OJD reports (Circula/ion Audi/s). This variable was measured as the 
proportion between the time that one newspaper was actually audited by the OJD and 
the time that the newspaper \Vas in operation. 
Both constructs reflect accountability practices of Spanish newspaper 
organizations. First. accountable organizations supplied information to the Media Guide 
on such critical attributes as their printing teclmology, the features of newspaper design, 
advertising rates, and names ofthe director ofthe newspaper, CEO ofthe company, and 
adve11ising manager. Moreover, accountable newspapers allowed their circulation to be 
audited by the OJD. Second, newspaper organizations were never obliged to render 
information to the Media Guide or to be audited by the OJD. Third, both the Media 
Guide and the OJD were legally compelled to provide their services to any newspaper 
asking for them. Fourth, no other source of data gathered information about the internal 
attributes ofnewspapers, with the aforementioned exception ofthe mercantile register 
since 1990, or audited their circulation. 
Pressures for accountability. Social rewards and pressures from powerful constituents 
influence organizationallevels of accountability, according to the suggestion of 
Hypothesis 2. Accountability demands, we argue, do not arise from the wider 
sociocultural environment with an invariable magnitude but vary across time. In 
particular, we expect that accountability practices will garner lower social support 
during periods of dictatorship than during periods of democracy, and this in turn will 
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imply a lower influence on firms' likelihood of survival. Democracies are characterized 
by the practice of rendering accounts to constituents, and such a norm, we contend, 
pervades the domain of organizations existing at this time. Dictatorships, in contrast, 
provide less information on their activities and criteria of resource allocation to external 
parties, and we argue that such habits permeate the realm of firms during this era. 
To test Hypothesis 2, which indicates that social support and constituents' 
demands influence the degree oforganizational accountability, we have further 
aggregated the Pre-Corporate Disc10sure Regulation and Post-Corporate Disc10sure 
Regulation subperiods into a more comprehensive one, the Democratic epoch (1978­
1993). Organizationallevels of accountability exhibited during this epoch will be 
compared with those existing during the Franco era (1966-1977) to ascertain the 
eventual differences in pressures for accountability during two remarkably different 
political regimes: dictatorship and democracy. 
Control variables 
Sllrvival rates may also be influenced by independent factors other than 
accollntability. Drawing on the vast empirical work of population ecologists on 
newspaper organizations, we have controlled for both organizational and environmental 
variables to test the robustness ofthe models shown in this investigation. Three 
organizational attributes were considered as control variables. Newspapers' contents 
were controlled through a dummy variable (Can'oH, 1985; Miner et al., 1990). We 
accounted for this with one (1) where the newspaper \Vas characterized by general 
contents and zero (O) ifthe daily was dominated by one subject matter (e.g., sports, 
business, medicine, or ship transportation), that is, if it was specialized. Market focus 
\Vas measured using two dummy control variables of coverage. Papers distributed to at 
least 15 Spanish provinces were c1assified as of national coverage. The dummy variable 
was coded one (1) if the daily had a national coverage and zero (O) if otherwise. 
Moreover, newspapers distributed to 14 or fewer Spanish provinces but to more than 
one province were c1assified as of regional cOl'erage. The regional coverage variable 
was coded one (1) if a daily met with the abovementioned criterion; it was coded zero 
(O) otherwise. We measured, hence, the effects ofpapers with a local focus, that is, 
dailies distributed to just one province, through a linear combination ofthe two dummy 
variables of coverage. Coverage may also be considered as a proxy variable of size. 
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Following the Box-Jenkins methodology, we have fitted the best stationary time-series 
model to the circulation data of national, regional, and local OJD-affiliated newspapers. 
We have then used these estimations to test which averages are larger, for independent 
samples and different variances. The results showed support for the notion that the mean 
of national newspapers is larger than that of regional ones (p < 0.0000001), and the 
latter being also larger than that oflocal ones (p < 0.0000001). Lastly, we entered a 
dummy control variable to reflect the impact of ne\Vspapers belonging to the single 
political party (Miner et al., 1990), which \Ve designated as party press. We accounted 
for this with one (l) if the newspaper \Vas o\Vned by the single party and zero (O) if 
otherwise. 
In this study, we used five variables to control for environmental effects. 
Competition was measured through population density (Carroll and Hannan, 1989; 
Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Miner et al.. 1990). The nOIIDlonotonic effects of 
population density on mortality rates have been tested in the empirical contributions of 
population ecologists (e.g., Baum and Mezias, 1992; Baum and Korn, 1996). Population 
density \Vas defined as the number of operating ne\Vspapers at the point of one daily' s 
exit. We created the density and the square of density divided by 100 (densifJ//IOO) 
variables as indicators ofthis effect. Niche \Vidth approaches the market prospects of a 
population of organizations. The present study comprises the market prospects ofthe 
ne\vspaper industry of Spain as the population (in millions) ofliterate people who are 
older than 16 years. Data to support this variable were gathered from the Labor Force 
SlIl'l'ey (Encllesta de Población Actira), a quarterly report published by the Spanish 
National Bureau of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE). We used the 
gross national prodllct (GNP, in milliard pesetas) as an indicator ofthe economic 
situation of the country (Carroll and Delacroix, 1982). Information about the GNP was 
collected from the reports of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). To measure trends in GNP during the period, GNP data are 
shown in constant currency in comparison with the GNP value of 1986, as provided in 
the OECD repol1s. We entered two variables to measure control for the activity ofthe 
ne\Vspaper industry. Information on the consumption o[newsprint (in 100 million tons) 
\Vas gathered from the OECD reports; data on the consumption o[books and magazines 
\Vas collected from the Spanish National Accounts. Both variables are also shown in 
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constant currency, with 1986 designated as the base year. Lastly, we accounted for the 
fact that our observation periods started when some newspapers were a1ready in 
operation. To control for these 1eft-truncated data (see Guo, 1993), we entered the 
variable Lag (Age). It was created for the years 1966, 1978, and 1990, according to the 
mode1s. 
Model 
We have used lifetime data mode1s (Lawless, 1982; Cox and Oakes, 1984), due 
both to the dynamics ofthe phenomenon of organizational survival and to the existence 
of censored values (Morita, Lee, and Mowday, 1993). First, following Levinthal (1991), 
a parametric analysis was conducted to test the distribution fit by app1ying both 
Akaike' s (1974) criterion on model comparisons, such that the chosen model maximizes 
A = log (maximum likelihood) - (number of estimated parameters), and Schwarz's 
(1978) criterion, which establishes that the chosen model maximizes B = log (maximum 
likelihood) - Y2 log (n) x (number of estimated parameters) (see Rust and Schmútlein, 
1985, for a comparison ofthe two criteria). We have used the SAS package (SAS 
Institute, 1990) to calculate the log (maximum likelihood) ofthe data distribution under 
consideration (see Table 1). The 10gnorma1 distribution provides the best fit of the data 
as it l11aximizes both Akaike' s and Schwarz's criteria. 
-------------------- Inse11 Table 1 about here -------------------
The 10gnorl11al distriblltion aSSUl11es a linear relationship between the logarithm 
ofthe dependent variable and the independent variables. Models contained in this study 
can be expressed in the following fonn: 
log (t) =a + ~X + (Jf; 
such that t is the organizational duration, ~ is a vector of coefficients for the independent 
variables, X represents the exogenous and control variables, (J is a scale parameter, and E 
is a random error. If ~ is positive, it means that the process of accountabi1ity increases 
life chances of newspapers, or (its converse) it decreases the failure rates; if ~ is 
negative, the opposite Olltcome results. The infiuence ofthe independent variables on 
survival chances (E(t)) or (its converse) on mortality rates (r(t)) may be analyzed as 
follows (Law1ess, 1982; Cox and Oakes, 1984): 
r(t) = f(t)/S(t) = lim .t.l ..... oPr(failure at t, t+~t \ alive at t)/~t 
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such that f(t) is the density function ofthe f lognonnal variable and S(t) is the survival 
function of f. 
Second, we estimated the lifetime data models that test the diverse hypotheses by 
entering into the location parameter the values of the exogenous and control variables. 
The coefficients were estimated using the LIFEREG method (SAS Institute, 1990: 997-
1025). 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The population ofnewspapers consists of276 entities; 238 dailies were c1assified as of 
general contents while the remaining 38 newspapers were dominated by a specialized 
focus. As far as coverage is concerned, 30 dailies targeted the national audience, 56 
papers a regional audience, and 186 newspapers a local audience. The population 
experienced a dramatic increase in the number of newspapers audited at least once by 
the OJD, growing from 25% of the population during the Franco era (1966-1977) to 
49% in the Pre-Corporate Disc10sure Regulation subperiod (1978-1989), and peaking at 
60% in the Post-Corporate Disc10sure Regulation subperiod (1990-1993). Lastly, 42 
dailies \Vere owned by the State political party (until 1977), and 118 newspapers already 
operated at the starting point ofthe period of observation, 1966. 
-------------------- Insert Table 2 about here --------------------
We calculated a regression for the complete period under study (1966-1993) to 
test the influence ofthe different variables on tbe long-range performance (survival) of 
the entire population (Hypothesis 1; see model I in Table 2). The hypothesis is 
supported if tbe coefficients for the two variables of accountability (the Media Guide 
Accol/n/abili/yand Circula/ion Al/di/s) are positive and statistically significant. Model 1 
shows that coefficients of both measures for accountability are positive and statistically 
significant (p < 0.0001). These results provide strong support for H 1: The practice of 
rendering voluntary accounts to external constituencies has a positive effect on 
organizational survival. Control variables such as national coverage, regional coverage, 
and Log (Age), as well as those variables related to newspapers' market (e.g., GNP, 
consumption of newsprint, and consumption ofbooks and journals) also affected the 
survival chances of organizations in this population. On the other hand, densitl/l 00 
showed a low significant (p < 0.1), positive effect on life prospects. 
We have used lifetime models in the Franco era (1966-1977) and the Democratic 
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(1978-1993) epoch to test the reaction of the population to environmental pressures for 
accountability (Hypothesis 2; see models 2 and 3 in Table 2). The hypothesis is 
supported ifthe coefficients ofthe accountability measures for the Democratic epoch's 
model are positive and show stronger significance than those obtained for the Franco 
era's model. Results presented in model2 provide support for H2: In the model 
calculated for the Democratic epoch, the two measures for accountability are positive 
and statistically significant (p < 0.0001 for both variables). In contrast, results obtained 
for the Franco era only show significance for the coefficient of the Media Guide 
Accountability (p < 0.001). Therefore, we contend, environmental pressures for 
accountability during the Democratic epoch provoked the deployment of more 
accountability practices by newspapers than during the Franco era, and this in turn had a 
differential impact on survival chances of firms in each epoch. Results obtained for the 
control variables of the Franco era revealed no significant effect on the likelihood of 
survival of firms. In contrast, control variables for the Democratic epoch showed effects 
on survival similar to those noted in model 1. 
Finally, \Ve have calculated two regressions (models 4 and 5 shown in Table 2) 
to test the significance ofthe coefficients ofthe accountability measures concerning 
practices developed before and after 1990, that is, when a change in the accounting 
reglllation required Spanish companies to both prepare more comprehensive accounting 
infonnation and to deposit their financial statements in a public registry (Hypotheses 3a 
and 3b). The poplllation ecology prediction (H3b) suggests that the enactment of 
compulsory accollnting regulation does not affect the existing levels of accountability. It 
is Suppo11ed if coefficients for both models are positive and statistically significant. In 
contrast, the stakeholder prediction (H3a) indicates that the promulgation of new 
compulsory accounting regulation affects the existing degree of accountability. It is 
supported if coefficients for model 4 are positive and statistically significant while 
coefficients for model 5 have weaker significance. Results presented in models 4 and 5 
support H3a (stakeholder prediction): With regard to the Pre-Corporate Disclosure 
Regulation subperiod (1978-1989), the Media Guide Accountability variable had a 
positive coefficient (1.3268) and strong significance (p < 0.001). Likewise, the 
Circulatiol1 Audits measure had a positive coefficient (0.5871) and statistical 
significance (p < 0.05). In contrast, coefficients ofboth accountability variables during 
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the Post-Corporate Disclosure Regulation subperiod were positive (0.5795 and 0.8766), 
but only the Circulation Audits construct showed sorne significance (p < 0.1). Control 
variables such as density and densitl/1 00, which controlled for the effects of 
competition, displayed significant effects on survival during the Pre-Corporate 
Disclosure Regulation subperiod (1978-1989), whereas variables controlling for general 
and industry economic conditions (e.g., GNP, market prospects, consumption of 
newsprint) showed a significant inf1uence on life prospects of organizations during the 
Post-Corporate Disc10sure Regulation subperiod (1990-1993). 
DISCUSSION 
The prediction that external accountability has a salutary effect on organizational 
survival is at least implicitly suggested by several studies (e.g., population ecology, 
institutional theory, resource dependence theory, and stakeholder theory). As noted at 
the outset, however, empirical testing ofthis proposition has been overlooked by 
organizational analysts. The findings presented here show unequivocal support for the 
notion that organizations that render accounts oftheir activities are invested of 
legitimacy, and this in turn increases their access to resources and extends their life 
chances. These findings, however, do not imply a unidimensional relationship between 
the notions of accountability and organizational survival. In contrast, we assert that 
accountability is among the factors that inf1uence environmental selection. 
The results of this study are supported by an empirical investigation of the entire 
newspaper industry ofSpain during the period 1966-1993. This country, we contend, 
experienced arare combination of radical and peaceful changes in its economic, social, 
and political structures amid a relatively short period oftime. During the observation 
periodo the country \vitnessed a steady trend toward economic deregulation and market 
liberalization from a previous situation of economic concentration and autarky; and 
toward playing an active role in the international arena after a long tradition of political 
and economic isolation. Spain, thus, constitutes a quite unique social setting to study 
how organizations deal with their ever-changing environments, especially in cases of 
firms characterized by considerable ambiguity in their goals. This ambiguity particularly 
applies to newspaper organizations, which intermingle the features of both production 
and institutionalized organizations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Our findings rely on the quality of the databases used in this investigation. First, 
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we were able to gather information on the external accountability practices of the entire 
population of newspapers and to measure the independent variables at a point in time 
before the dependent variable was measured (see Miner et al., 1990: 708). This a1lowed 
us to explore the possible causal relationship between accountability and organizational 
survival. Second, the sources of data were able to capture that aspect of accountability 
that linked newspaper organizations to the population of advertising companies and the 
society at large; both the OJD audits and the Media Guide reports provided constituents 
with accurate information on newspapers' circulation as we1l as on some internal 
attributes of these firms. Advertising companies, for example, used this information as a 
central element in deciding in which media to advertise, in turn supplying newspaper 
organizations with an outstanding proportion oftheir total income. 
Our findings show a clear-cut relationship between practices of accountability 
and organizational survival, everything else remaining equa!. These results, however, 
posit some doubts about the rationality of organizations that do not publicize their 
internal attributes; that is, why some firms would not be accountable given the effects 
on their legitimacy and survival. As Amburgey and Rao (1996: 1274) contend, this 
question concerns the vicious circle of "poor performance which excites high risk 
taking and poor performance.-, In this context, \Ve argue, poor performance 
organizations would make a Sh011-term decision not to render accounts of their 
activities. To proceed with accountability practices, the firm would have to expect to 
achieve higher performance. Poor performance organizations that dispose of 
accountability practices enmesh themselves in a process of lack of legitimacy and 
poorer performance, which constitutes a serious threat to the firm' s survival. 
The results provide support for the prediction that accountability has a positive 
impact on survival chances. This conclusion has three additional implications. First, 
albeit with different degrees of intensity, it applies to the complete period of study as 
we1l as to its subperiods. The results reveal that organizations that do not respond to 
accountability demands face higher death rates in the long term than comparable 
organizations that do. The generalizability ofthe concIusion applies to the sundry 
political, social, and economic circumstances experienced in Spanish society during the 
period 1966-1993. These diverse circumstances did not buffer nonaccountable 
organizations from failure in the long termo The findings obtained in this study, thus, are 
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consistent with the notion that organizations that embed accountability practices in their 
routines enhance their survival chances. Second, the results of this investigation support 
Hannan and Freeman's (1984) assertion that organizations that deliver information-
loaded products, as weII as those that are highly political, face strong accountability 
pressures. As we noted aboye, the newspaper industry fits into both categories of 
organizations. Third, several studies highlight accountability as a salient feature of 
modern organizations. The results ofthis study demonstrate that the importance ofthe 
accountability process pervades the domain ofthe survival chances of organizations 
operating in this population. 
This paper supports the prediction that organizations' level of accountability wiII 
be higher if external pressures for information exist. Although it is tempting to suggest 
that market and institutional pressures are adversarial in nature, the results of this 
analysis show the concomitant effect of such pressures in eliciting compliance from 
newspaper organizations to demands for accountability. First, we demonstrated that 
institutional pressures for accountability were significantly higher during the 
Democratic epoch than the Franco era, and this in turn affected the life chances of finns. 
Thus, organizations of this population had to achieve higher levels of accountability 
during the Democratic epoch to maintain the same survival chances they enjoyed during 
the less demanding. Franco era. In short, the higher effects of accountability on 
organizational survival during the Democratic epoch (1978-1993) compared with the 
Franco era (1966-1977), we argue, can be at least partiaIIy attributed to stronger 
pressures for accountability arising [1'Om the broader sociocultural environment during 
periods of democracy. In such periods, accountability constitutes an institutional 
demand that pervades the organizational terrain. Second, advertising companies 
constitute a substantial segment o[ the newspaper business process. Sohn, Ogan, and 
Polich (1986) describe the newspaper business process as the sale of newspaper issues 
to readers and the subsequent "sale" of the reader to advertisers. According to these 
authors, while the first part of the process accounts for one third of newspapers' sales 
turnover, the "sale" of the reader accounts for the remaining two thirds of total revenues. 
Therefore, we contend that newspaper organizations are largely dependent on the 
resources supplied by advertisers (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In the particular case of 
the Spanish newspaper industry, the liberalization ofthe Spanish economy that 
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accompanied the transition from dictatorship to democracy accentuated the importance 
ofthe advertising industry. For example, according to reports on the market for 
publicity made by Nielsen Repress, the number of advertisements published in Spanish 
newspapers increased from 38,630 in 1976 to 100,478 in 1992, which in turn increased 
the number of equivalent full pages containing advertisements from 33,240 in 1976 to 
78,230 in 1992. This increase in both the number of advertisements and pages 
containing advertisements resulted in significant growth in the volume oftotal 
investments made by advertising agencies in newspaper publicity which, according to 
the Nielsen Repress, increased from USD 200 million in 1975 to USD 1.575 billion in 
1993. Overall, these market data depict the advertising sector as an expanding industry 
in the country. Accountability demands stemming from both institutional and market 
forces had a significant impact on the behavior of the newspaper industry. The 
percentage ofnewspapers audited by the OJD increased from 25% ofthe population 
during the 1966-1977 subperiod to 60% of the population in the 1990-1993 subperiod. 
Likewise, a comparison of the accountability measures for the Franco era (1966-1977) 
versus the Democratic epoch (1978-1993) yielded support for the prediction that 
pressures for accountability were stronger in the latter period, and this in turn had a 
selective effect on organizations ofthis population. 
The results ofthe study support the prediction ofthe stakeholder theory that 
compulsory accountability requirements will affect existing levels of accountability. 
This finding. hence, endorses the notion that a larger number of stakeholders leads to 
ambiguous accountability relationships, and that this in turn diminishes the existing 
levels of accountability. This tidy logic implies that compulsory accountability 
regulation affects practices of accountability ifthe new regulation enhances the position 
of one category of stakeholder at the expense of others, with the concomitant effects on 
the allocation of organizational resources to meet the new demands for information. It 
was the case, we argue, with the accountability requirements established in the Decree 
on Corporate Disclosure, which required Spanish firms to apply the new regulation and 
to submit their financial statements to a public registry. This information was of critical 
relevance for stakeholders such as creditors, customers, and potential investors of 
newspaper organizations. Moreover, sorne ofthe items that firms reported to the Media 
Guide (e.g., names ofthe director ofthe newspaper and CEO ofthe company, printing 
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teclmology, and advertisement rates) were redundant with the information to be reported 
in the Notes to financial statements. 
Taken together, the results oftesting for the three hypotheses support the 
prediction that institutional processes do not always elicit conformity and compliance 
from organizations (Oliver, 1991; Scott and Meyer, 1994). The findings ofthis papel' 
reveal a rich variety of organizational responses to institutional pressures for 
accountability. For example, Hypothesis 1 showed that organizations that implemented 
the tactic of compliance with institutional pressures to render accounts of their activities 
enhanced their life chances in comparison with those that did no1. This conclusion stems 
from the analysis ofthe complete observation periodo Its applicability to the different 
subperiods, however, is not straightforward and provides t\VO interesting insights. First, 
organizations are prone to dismiss institutional pressures "when the potential for 
external enforcement of institutional rules is perceived to be low" (Oliver, 1991: 156). 
Results oftesting Hypothesis 2 suggest that newspaper organizations during the Franco 
era (1966-1977) showed a 10\V profile in the activity of reporting about their internal 
attributes. Therefore, we argue, newspaper organizations at that time perceived that 
institutional pressures for accountability did not entail an environmental threat ayer 
organizational survival. Consequently, some organizations dismissed institutional 
pl'essures fol' accountability and still survived. Second, Oliver (1991: 153)asserts that a 
tactic ofbalance will be implemented "when external expectations conflict ... (and) 
organizations' interests may be sel'ved most effectively by obtaining an acceptable 
compromise on competing objectives and expectations." In the case ofthe Spanish 
newspaper industry, a tactic of balance was the response of organizations to the 
increasing accountability requirements enacted in the Decree on Corporate Disclosure of 
1990. Newspaper organizations accommodated the demands from different sources of 
accountability by shifting their reporting on redundant internal attributes from the Media 
Guide to the Notes to financial statements. Dailies, however, continued to report to the 
OJD. 
Control variables provide interesting conclusions on the behavior of 
organizations ofthis population. First, the coefficients ofthe Log (Age) variable were 
significant and showed that firms in operation at the begilming of each subperiod of 
analysis had 10nger survival expectations than the average ofthe population. Second, 
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competition was measured through the number of newspapers operating in each 
subperiod. Coefficients of the Density and Densitl/1 00 control variables for model 4 
revealed a nonmonotonic relationship with survival. These results concurred with those 
found by Baum and Kom (1996: 285) and, thus, departed from the findings of the 
density-dependence model (Hannan and Freeman, 1989: 131-141). Lastly, the 
coefficients ofthe Party Press variable were nonsignificant for all models. This finding 
deviates from the notion that firms with institutionallinkages are buffered from the 
inf1uence of societal and cultural expectations (Miner et al., 1990; Baum and Oliver, 
1991) and thereby are enmeshed in a process of partial selection. The explanation for 
this seemingly contradictory finding, we contend, rests on the State ownership of party-
affiliated dailies. In this respect, several studies argue that public sector agencies satisfy 
intense pressures to render accounts of their activities (Vickers, 1965; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984). 
Our paper also bears considerable limitations, which could encourage future 
work. First, the Spanish society underwent a turbulent period of changes which forged 
strong institutional and market pressures for accountability on organizations, especially 
during the Democratic epoch. Ultimately, these intense pressures could be attributed to 
the social reaction to the authoritarian enviromnent that characterized the Franco era. 
Therefore. only further research on the relationship between accountability and 
organizational survival conducted in more stable settings will shed light on the 
generalizability of our conclusions. Second, the ne\Vspaper industry bears potential 
exposure to accountability pressures. Hence, we contend, future work on populations 
that do not fit into Hmman and Freeman's categories of organizations that experience 
strong pressures for accountability will reveal the consistency of our findings. Third, our 
investigation has used the population of Spanish newspapers as a unit of analysis. 
Therefore, we could not discem pressures for accountability from sources that seem to 
predominate at the locallevel (e.g., market forces; see Hannan, et al., 1995; Dacin, 
1997) from those operating at the globallevel (e.g., institutional prescriptions). Finer-
grained data will reveal the extent to which pressures for acountability stem from local 
and global sources. Fourth, \Ve relied on coverage variables (e.g., national, regional, and 
local), measured through the circulation of OJD-affiliated newspapers as proxies of size. 
The development of indicators of size for the entire population provides considerable 
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potential for future work. Lastly, our results suggested the existence of a causal link 
between the concepts of accountability and survival, everything else remaining equal. 
Because of our lack of circulation data on non-OJD-affiliated newspapers, we could not 
identify to what extent accountability could capture the effects of variables such as size 
and performance in organizational survival. 
This paper has focused on the survival implications of organizational responses 
to societal and cultural expectations of accountability. Our propositions have been 
tested in the unique sociallaboratory provided by the Spanish society during the period 
1966-1993. It allowed us to find a rich variety of organizational responses to the ever-
increasing sociocultural pressures for accountability. The findings of this study may 
provide some insights into the prediction of several organizationalliteratures that 
accountability plays a distinctive role in the process of firms' selection. 
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Table 1 
Distribution Fit 
Model Akaike 
Criterion 
Lognormal -634.273 
Loglogistic -638.866 
Weibull -639.538 
Gomperz -666.227 
Normal -792.484 
Logistic -798.256 
Extreme Value -823.731 
Schwarz 
Criterion 
-637.714 
-642.487 
-643.158 
-669.848 
-796.105 
-801.876 
-827.351 
Log 
Likelihood 
-632.273 
-636.866 
-637.538 
-664.227 
-790.484 
-796.256 
-821.731 
31 
Location Scale 
Parameter Parameter 
3.5911 2.6780 
0.0950 0.6499 
0.0125 0.5415 
-3.4843 -0.0236 
57.1423 50.5503 
52.4978 30.1255 
84.8329 49.7286 
Table 2 
The Impact of Accountability on Survival Chances 
ModeJ 
1 2 3 4 5 
Total Period Franco Era Democratic Epoch Pre-Corporate Post-Corporate 
1966·1993 1966·1977 1978-1993 Disclosure Disclosure 
Regulation Regulation 
1978·1989 1990-1993 
Newspapers'contents -0.5032 t 
-6.0540 -0.3698 0.3118 -0.5037 
(0.305) (20982.6) (0.274) (0.299) (0.338) 
National Coverage 
-1.1889 0.1732 -0.8741 -0.2985 -0.2135 
(0.307) (1.415) (0.268) (0.303) (0.290) 
Regional Coverage 
-0.8425 -0.6069 -0.4956· -0.1867 -0.3461 
(0.239) (0.567) (0.218) (0.229) (0.257) 
Party Press -0,0276 0,6161 -0.2459 -0.0119 0.3726 
(0.248) (0.835) (0.261 ) (0.231 ) (0.642) 
Log(Age) 0.6764 - 0.1691 t 0.7980 0.8593 0.8025 
(0.058) (0,090) (0.056) (0.055) (0,066) 
Density 
-0.4259 -30.7667 -0.1568 -2.7058 -1.9474 
(0,260) (19.327) (0,234) (0.655) (1.439) 
Densitf/100 0.1925 t 12.6880 0,0907 1.1935 0.7304 
(0.104) (7.868) (0.093) (0.280) (0.519) 
Gross National Product -0.2025 0.0384 -0.2533 0,0801 -3.3165 
(0,062) (0.166) (0,076) (0.096) (0.779) 
Market Prospects 0.6999 -0.8859 0.8029 -0.6746 1.8455 
(0.206) (1.408) (0.330) (1.030) (0.515) 
Consumption of Newsprint -0.5288 3.4860 -0.7123 1.3690 9.2769 
(0.334) (4.595) (0.449) (2.097) (2.907) 
Consumption of Journals and 0.0118 0.0133 0.0194 t 0.0065 
Books 
(0.003) (0.013) (0.011 ) (0.018) 
Media Guide Accountability 2.3899 3.1632 1.7091 1.3268 0.5795 
(0.376) (0.853) (0.361 ) (0.362) (0.375) 
Circulation Audits 2.0052 1.1446 1.4716 0.5871 0.8766 t 
(0.341) (1.194) (0.295) (0.292) (0.519) 
Constant 11.3164 1878.5178 ·7,8071 162.3002 204.3118 t 
(17.860) (21015.73) (16.446) (46.809) (104.396) 
/ 342.7946 116.4441 334.5599 276.6518 201.9165 
d.f. 13 13 13 13 12 
•••• P < .0001; ••• P < .001; •• P < .01; • P < .05; t P< .1 
Standard Errors are in Parentheses 
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